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ARTICLES
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN INTERNET
COMMERCE:
A CALL FOR NEW FEDERAL GUIDELINES
AND THE CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT
PRIVACY COMMISSION
CHRISTOPHER F. CARLTON*
"Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the
next step which must be taken for the protection of the person,
and for securing to the individual.., the right to be let alone...
[Olf the desirability-indeed of the necessity-of some such
protection, there can, it is believed, be no doubt."1
I. INTRODUCTION
In an era that has been appropriately christened "The
Mr. Carlton is with the law firm of Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell in Wilmington,
Delaware. The views expressed in this Article are solely the views of the author. The
author thanks Lisa Dukes for her assistance in preparing the Article for publication.
1 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 205 (1890) (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs
Which Arise Independent of Contract 29 (2d ed. 1888)). See generally Randall P.
Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 1890-1990,
80 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1133-47 (1992) (comparing application of privacy rights in 1890 to
what is needed today). But cf Jennifer K Constance, Automated Fingerprint
IdentiFication Systems: Issues and Options Surrounding Their Use to Prevent Welfare
Fraud, 59 ALB. L. REV. 399 passim (1995) (arguing that finger imaging used to prevent
fraud on welfare system is not violation of privacy rights).
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Information Age" the Internet is utilized in virtually every area
of our society. The Internet is now used by approximately one-
half of the adult population of the United States, making it "the
fastest-growing medium in human history."2 For instance, it
took television more than thirteen years and radio more than
thirty-eight years to capture their respective comparable
audience bases.3 But despite the explosive growth in the use of
the Internet, confidence on the part of Internet users about their
privacy is lacking which has stunted the Internet's development
as a commercial medium.
Over the last twenty years, an overwhelming number of
Americans have reported that they have lost the ability to control
the collection and dissemination of their personal information
and that the current laws are not enough to protect their right of
privacy.4  Indeed, it is indisputable that our existing legal
framework did not envision the pervasive role information
technology would have on our society. Advancing technology
coupled with a growing population thirsty for information has
taken us to the point where the right of privacy has been
sacrificed for the almighty dollar.5
2 See Privacy in Electronic Communication, 1998: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property, House Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. 315 (March 26,
1998) (hereinafter "Hearings (stating testimony of Fred H. Cate, Professor of Law, Ind.,
Univ. Sch. Of Law); see also Mark Ishman, Computer Crimes and the Respondeat
Superior Doctrine: Employees Beware, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 6, 86 n. 12 (June 1, 2000)
(discussing explosive growth of Internet). But see Ofihine, On Purpose; In a Survey That
Contradicts Other Findings, Millions of Americans Said They Don't Use the Internet and
Don't Particularly Care to Star STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Sept. 22, 2000, at 4A
(reporting that majority of Americans who are not on Internet are not interested in
gaining access).
3 See Hearings, supra note 2, at - (identifying testimony of Professor Cate). See
generally Dina L. G. Borzekowski & Thomas N. Robinson, Viewing the Viewers: Ten
Video Cases of Children's Television Viewing Behaviors, 43 J. BROADCASTING &
ELECTRONIC MEDIA 506, 506 (Sept. 22, 1999) (reporting case studies of children's
television viewing habits); J. H. Cane, How to Get Your Town to Turn Off Television,
WHOLE EARTH REVIEW, Mar. 22, 1994, at 96 (discussing vital role television plays in
American life).
4 See Keith H. Hammonds, ed., Business Week/Harris Poll: Online Insecurity, BUS.
WK., Mar. 16, 1998, at 102 (reporting that consumers considered sacrifice in personal
privacy to be "the top reason people are staying off the Web--above cost, ease of use and
annoying marketing messages"). See generally Michael Grebb, Cable's Big Brother
Problem; Internet and Interactive Privacy Becomes an Issue, CABLEVISION, Nov. 13, 2000,
at 44 (discussing privacy issues brought forward by Internet); John Geralds, Lack of
Privacy is Main Internet Worry, NETWORK NEWS, Nov. 1, 2000, at 7 (reporting that
privacy is leading concern among Internet users).
5 See Karl D. Belgum, Who Leads at Half-time? Three Conflicting Visions of Internet
Privacy Policy, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (1999) ("The Internet raises new threats to
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The Internet poses a new set of challenges to privacy by its
functions and use because of the relative ease with which
information can be collected, sorted and disseminated. 6 But the
legal system has not sufficiently evolved and technological
advances have made the legal protections developed over the last
few centuries obsolete. 7 The current policy of self-regulation
whereby Internet users and operators are setting the rules and
regulations has proven to be ineffective.
Nowhere on the Internet is this loss of personal privacy more
apparent than in the area of Internet commerce. The Internet
has the potential to become the supreme commercial
marketplace-a virtual marketplace without walls where one
may shop from the comfort of home. The potential profits to
Internet merchants and the benefits to consumers from Internet
commerce are limitless. But privacy fears have drastically
slowed the public's acceptance of online commerce. 8 According to
a number of recent surveys, potential Internet consumers report
privacy, and enhances old threats as a result of the increased data processing capability of
computers combined with the data gathering and dissemination potential of the Internet
itself."). See generally Josh Duberman & Michael Beaudet, Privacy Perspectives for
Online Searchers, 8 SEARCHER 32, 32 (July 1, 2000) (revealing many ways information
about Internet users may be spread); Carol Levin, A Little Privacy, Government Activity,
PC MAGAZINE, July 1, 2000, at 92 (reporting survey which indicates that more than 80
percent of Internet users are willing to provide personal information).
6 See Julia Alpert Gladstone, Technology, The Law, and a Changing World in the
Twenty-First Century, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1907, 1913 (June 1999) ("The threat to
privacy increases substantially as the separate individual pieces of personal information
are collected, categorized, catalogued, and even sold to third parties."). See generally
Duberman & Beaudet, supra note 5, at 32; Donna GiUin, The Federal Trade Commission
and Internet Privacy, MARKETING RESEARCH: A MAGAZINE OF MANAGEMENT &
APPLICATIONS, Fall 2000, at 39 (discussing effectiveness of self-regulation proposed by
FTC in regards to corporate acquisition of information on Internet).
7 See Major R. Ken Pippin, Consumer Privacy on the Internet, It's 'Surfer Beware",
47 A.F. L. REV. 125, 126 (1999) ("Growth of the Internet and the popularity of that
technology has combined to create a perception that the Internet has out-paced oversight
and control."). But see Bezanson, supra note 1, at 1172-75 (arguing that current privacy
tort fails to protect individual interests); Jay Krasovec, Cyberspace: The Final Frontier,
for Regulation?31 AKRON L. REV. 101 passim (1997) ("[Elver changing technology on the
Internet means traditional concepts of law and regulation are too static and cannot
effectively govern cyberspace.").
8 See Belgum, supra note 5, at 4; see also Jerry Berman & Deirdre Mulligan, The
Internet and the Law: Privacy in the Digital Age: Work in Progress, 23 NOVA. L. REV.
549, 552-54 (Winter 1999) (discussing how reports of lack of privacy protection as barrier
to Internet commerce have lead corporations to engage in self-regulation). See generally
Jonathan Sidener, Pentium III Hits Stores Under Cloud; ID System Raises Privacy Fears,
THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Feb. 27, 1999, at A23 (reporting that privacy concerns exist
because of implementation of serial numbers inserted into Pentium III chips for purpose
of enhancing security for online commerce).
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that privacy protection is their number one concern and that if
privacy issues were effectively addressed, they would be more
likely to make online purchases. 9 It is therefore abundantly clear
that effective protection of personal information is an essential
precondition for social acceptance of the Internet as a commercial
medium.
The purpose of this Article is to expose the ways computer
technology has magnified the threat to informational privacy in
online commercial transactions and to advocate for the
implementation of comprehensive privacy legislation coupled
with the creation of an independent privacy commission to
oversee enforcement of the legislation. Implementation of those
proposals would ease the trepidation held by prospective online
consumers that is currently hindering the enormous growth
potential of Internet commerce. 10
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the right of
privacy in America and its application to electronic commerce.11
Part II also chronicles how the advent of electronic commerce has
threatened our fundamental right of privacy.1 2 Part III examines
the inadequate privacy safeguards currently in place.13 Part IV
of this Article recommends that to ensure the vitality of
electronic commerce, Congress should create a legal framework
for protecting personal privacy in online commercial transactions
and create an independent privacy commission to regulate that
9 See Seth Saier, Between Big Brother and the Bottom Line: Pivacy In Cyberspace,
5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 21 (Spring 2000) (citing survey in which 70% of consumers surveyed
noted privacy concerns as their primary reason for not providing personal information to
web sites); George B. Trubow, Regulating Transactions of the Internet, 24 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 831, 832 (1998) (stating that in Louis Harris-Alan Westin survey conducted in April
1998, eighty-seven percent of Internet user respondents said they were concerned about
threats to personal privacy); see also Domingo R. Tan, Personal Privacy in the
Information Age: Comparison of Internet Data Protection Regulations in the United
States and the European Union, 21 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 661, 664 (1999) (citing
Boston Consulting Group consumer survey in which more than 70% of consumers worry
about making on-line purchases).
10 See Tan, supra note 9, at 665 (indicating that more internet users would go online
if they felt their personal information would be better protected); see also Geralds, supra
note 4, at 7 (reporting majority of individuals surveyed feel internet users risk their
privacy every time they go online). See generally ARTHUR MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON
PRIVACY 23 (1971) ("[It] is essential to expose the ways computer technology is magnifying
the threat to informational privacy - a threat that we have faced in some form ever since
man began to take notes about himself and his neighbors.").
11 See infra notes 16-44 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 68-141 and accompanying text.
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legislation and ensure that it remains viable in view of emerging
technology.14 Finally, Part V of this Article concludes that these
measures, or other comparable measures, are vital to the success
of online commerce.1 5
II. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND ITS APPLICATION IN
INTERNET COMMERCE
At the heart of the right to privacy in today's information age
lies the political, social and economic values upon which early
notions of personal privacy originated. Thus, to fully appreciate
the right of privacy, an examination of privacy law must begin by
defining the right of privacy and tracing its origins. At that
point, current privacy protections can be assessed.
A. Defining The Right Of Privacy And Its Ohiins
Generations of lawyers, judges and legal scholars have long
explored the many facets of privacy and from what the "right to
privacy" originates.16  Commentators and the courts have
consistently invoked such notions as natural rights,' 7
fundamental human values, 18 or human dignity 19 as the
14 See infra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
16 See Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 242 (KB. 1769) ("It is certain every man
has a right to keep his own sentiments, if he pleases: he has certainly a right to judge
whether he will make them public, or commit them only to the sight of his friends."); see
also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205-07 (advocating individual's right to privacy
and remedies for its violation). See generally BARRINGTON MOORE, PRIVACY: STUDIES IN
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY (1984) (examining concept of privacy in various societies
including 4th century BC Athens, ancient Hebrew society and ancient China).
17 See Pavesevich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 191, 215 (1904) (justifying
recognition of right of privacy by analogy to human being's natural right to control one's
body); David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy's Place in the Intellectual History of Tort
Law, 41 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 769, 774-802 (1991) (discussing historical basis of
right to privacy as natural right). See generally Robert P. Lawry, The Right to Privacy in
the United States and Ireland 32 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT'L L. 163 passim (Winter,
2000) (book review) (discussing evolution of natural law).
18 See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-05 (1977) (noting that sanctity
of family is protected because it is fundamental human value, part of nation's history and
traditions); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (holding that right of privacy
granted by Constitution includes fundamental personal rights relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education). See
generally Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and
American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963 passim (discussing human dignity
as foundation of privacy).
19 See Edward J. Bloustin, Group Privacy The Right to Huddle, 8 RUTGERS-CAM. L.
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foundations of privacy. But even though notions of rights of
privacy have existed for hundreds of years, 20 it was not until the
last part of the Nineteenth Century that legal scholars first
considered the notion of privacy as a legal right.2 1
The modern right of privacy traces its origins to the seminal
article on the subject co-authored by Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis in 1890,22 in which they proclaimed that each
person had the right "to be let alone."23 Warren and Brandeis
J. 219, 278 (1977) ("The right to be let alone protects the integrity and the dignity of the
individual."); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment
"Reasonableness", 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1725 n.332 (1998) ("[T]o reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person.. ."(quoting
Preamble to Charter of United Nations)); Rachel Weissmann, Constitutional Law What
"Choice" Do They Have?- Protecting Pregnant Minors' Reproductive Rights Using State
Constitutions, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 129, 149 (1999) (discussing decision to terminate
pregnancy as private and basic to individual dignity and autonomy).
20 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (stating "various guarantees
create zones of privacy"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (stating "right to
privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the
people"); see also Rob Reilly, Conceptual Foundations of Privacy: Looking Backward
Before Stepping Forward, 6 RICH. J. L. & PUB. POLY 6, 11 (1999) (noting early nineteenth
century Americans invented barbed wire and built fences along frontier, invented private
Pullman compartment for railroad travel and have otherwise "continually sought to
satisfy their desire to be let alone").
21 See Reilly, supra note 20, at 9 (explaining need for right of privacy at close of
Nineteenth Century:
The emergence of a newly-industrialized society required a greater quantity and
quality of information than did pre-industrial society. The U.S. labor force was
migrating toward urban centers where industry was burgeoning. The aggregation
of so many people into condensed areas greatly facilitated compiling information.
This fostered a greater reliance on newly-developed machines, by which to boost
the process of information gathering.... This erosion [of an individual's ability to
shield information about himself from the public] became more pronounced when,
in 1876, the telephone was invented, followed closely by the invention of the radio.
At that time, there was an increasing ability of information technology to
pervasively intrude upon privacy.
see also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (holding unique
attributes of broadcasting can intrude on privacy of home without prior warning of
content); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 (1997) (striking down provisions of
Communications Decency Act of 1996 criminalizing internet transmissions of obscene
or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 for being unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad).
22 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, 195; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing fundamental right to be free
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy). See generally Nicholas
Bieter, Current Public Law and Policy Issues: Minnesota's Riht of Privacy Torts:
Expanding Common Law Beyond Its Reasonable, Constitutional Bounds In Lake v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 177 (1998) (discussing Warren-
Brandeis article recognizing "right of privacy" or "right to be let alone").
23 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 (declaring right "to be let alone" as
matter of personal privacy). See generally Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A
Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703 (1990) (discussing impact
of Warren and Brandeis on privacy law in United States); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right Of
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authored their article to shed light on the fact that technology
was in a perpetual state of evolution and that the American legal
system must concomitantly evolve in order to protect an
individual's right to privacy. 24 From this influential article, the
courts began to construct a number of privacy principles that
generally became known as the "right of privacy."25 Developed
incrementally on a case-by-case basis, those privacy principles
provided individuals with privacy-related causes of action based
upon the law of property, tort and contract. 26
Much later in judicial history,27 even though the term privacy
is not defined or even mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, the
United States Supreme Court deemed privacy rights so
fundamental that it established a constitutional right of privacy
through a line of decisions thereby enhancing existing common
law principles. 28
Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 752 (1989) (discussing Warren & Brandeis' interpretation
of tort law right of privacy).
24 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195-96 (stating mass media was
'overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency"; such
dangerous technology included "instantaneous photographs" and "newspaper
enterprise"); see also David Grant, Comment, Rights of Privacy-An Analytical Model for
the Negative Rights of Attribution, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 529, 531 (noting Warren's
motivation for writing article, at least in part, was due to intrusiveness of reporters at his
daughter's wedding); Alexander Rodriguez, Comment, All Bark, No Byte: Employee E-
Mail Privacy Rights in the Private Sector Workplace, 47 EMORY L. J. 1439 (1998)
(suggesting as technology moves forward and electronic communication is fully developed,
lawmakers will be forced to ensure right to privacy).
25 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (recognizing constitutional right of privacy); EVAN
HENDRICKS ET AL., YOUR RIGHT To PRIvACY: A BASIc GUIDE To LEGAL RIGHTS IN AN
INFORMATION SocIETY XIII (2d ed. 1990) (detailing origins of right to privacy); see also
Matthew N. Kleiman, Comment, The Right to Financial Privacy Versus Computerized
Law Enforcement: A New Fight in an Old Battle, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1169, 1169-70 (1992)
(observing courts, as opposed to legislature, were first to recognize right of privacy).
26 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193 (urging States should give some form
of tort relief to persons whose private affairs were exploited by others); see also Grant,
supra note 24, at 532 (discussing gradual development of privacy-related causes of action);
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 384-89 (1960) (stating same).
27 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (1973) ("The Constitution does not explicitly mention
any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however,.., the Court has recognized that a
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist
under the Constitution."); see also Bryan S. Schultz, Comment, Electronic Money,
Internet Commerce, And The Right To Financial Privacy: A Call For New Federal
Guidelines, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 787 (1999) ("[Tlhe United States Supreme Court did
not begin to explore constitutional principles relating to privacy until the first half of the
twentieth century."). See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (deciding
individual's right to privacy involving sexual and reproductive matters).
28 See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85 (holding that right of privacy exists under
United States Constitution even though not expressly mentioned, but rather that "specific
guarantees within the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance.").
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In the landmark decision of Katz v. United State, 29 the
Supreme Court declared that an individual has a right of privacy
whenever the individual has a "reasonable expectation of
privacy."30 With respect to online commerce, there are several
core "expectations or privacy" that individuals have long held
that are now being invaded.31 Most of the invasions of privacy
involve information privacy, which incorporates several privacy
interests that are at times distinct and at times inextricable. 32
Such interests include: the interest in preventing unauthorized
access to personal information; the interest in preventing
disclosure of information; the interest in ensuring accuracy of
information; the freedom from observation of personal
communications and anonymity.33 All of those privacy interests
fall under the broad purview of "the right to be let alone" as
articulated by Brandeis and Warren.34
29 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
30 Katz., 389 U.S. at 359 (holding individual is entitled to privacy in public places,
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion created current test for determining whether
expectation of privacy is reasonable); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (establishing person must exhibit subjective expectation of privacy and
society must recognize that expectation as reasonable); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238,
244-45 (1976) (involving individual's right as to personal appearance); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446-47 (1976) (involving individual's right of privacy in context of
criminal investigation).
31 See generally Alison J. Choppelas, Symposium on Internet Privacy, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 345, 345 (2000) (discussing privacy expectations on
the Internet); Deborah M. McTigue, Marginalizing Individual Privacy on the Internet, 5
B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 5, 5 (1999) (stating Internet users are under delusion that
electronic communications are private); Pippin, supra note 7 at 125 (suggesting privacy
policy statements do little to safeguard Internet user's privacy).
32 See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1980)
("Privacy is a term with many meanings."); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.7(B) (1995) ("The simple word privacy has taken on so many
different meanings in so many different corners of the law that it has largely ceased to
convey any single coherent concept."). But see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600
(1977) (holding governmental storage of personal data in computers not invasion of
constitutionally protected zones of privacy).
33 See McTigue, supra note 31, at 5 (stating reasonable expectation of privacy may be
based on false perception of security and cyberspace anonymity); Pippin, supra note 7, at
128 (discussing personally identifiable information and its accessibility); Myrna L. Wigod,
Privacy in Publ'c and Private E-Mail and On-line Systems, 19 PACE L. REV. 95, (1998)
(listing privacy interests that individuals have relating to Internet).
34 In their seminal piece on privacy, Warren and Brandeis state:
The protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the
medium of writing or of the arts... is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more
general right of the individual to be let alone. It is like the right not to be assaulted or
beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the
right not to be defamed.
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205; see also Kramer, supra note 23 at 710-11
[Vol. 16:393
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B. Privacy Rights And Commerce On The Internet
1. The origins of the Internet
The origins of the Internet date back to 1969 when the
Department of Defense began developing a "robust computer
network that would survive a nuclear attack on the United
States."35 Initially, the Internet remained relatively unknown
and was utilized only by researchers, mathematicians, engineers,
and computer experts. 36 As the use of personal home computers
heightened and Internet "browser" software was developed that
allowed users to share and access information by linking various
computer networks and made file transfer protocol easier to
understand and utilize, the use of the Internet grew
exponentially and terms such as "web-surfing" and "online
commerce" have now become common vernacular. 37
2. Commerce on the Internet
The growth rate of the Internet is unprecedented in human
history and its exponential growth is expected to continue well
into the twenty-first century. 38 Experts believe that within the
next few years "billions of dollars will be poured into the
("the right to privacy is firmly ingrained in the common law of most states and occupies a
prominent place in American society and jurisprudence."); Bieter, supra note 22 at 182
("The makers of the Constitution appreciated that to civilized man, the most valuable of
rights is the right to be let alone.").
35 Schultz, supra note 27, at 784; see also Joe Baladi, Comment, Building Castles
Made of Glass-Security on the Internet, 21 U. ARK LITTLE ROCK L.J. 251, 252 (1999)
("The military decided the United States needed a communication network that would
work even if large portions of the support network were destroyed or lost.") (footnote
omitted). See generally Peter H. Salus, The Net: A Brief History of Origins, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 671, (1998) (discussing origins of Internet).
36 See Baladi, supra note 35, at 252-53; Gladstone, supra note 6, at 1909 (noting
Internet was initially for academics and government officials); Maureen A. O'Rourke,
Fencing Cyberspace: Dra wing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 615 and
n. 13 (1998) (describing origin of Internet).
37 See David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much About Transmitting Client
Confidences By Internet E-Mai, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 462-63 (Spring 1998)
(providing excellent discussion of explosive growth of Internet); Charles R. Topping, The
Surf Is Up, But Who Owns The Beach? - Who Should Regulate Commerce On The
Internet, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 179, 192-93 (1999) (discussing
growth of internet); Thomas F. O'Neil & Kevin P. Gallagher, et al., Detours on the
Information Superhighway: The Erosion of Evidentiary Privileges in Cyberspace and
Beyond, 1997 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 13 (1997) (discussing growth of internet).
38 See Tan, supra note 9, at 664 (noting that Internet use is expected to grow to
approximately 320 million users worldwide by the year 2002).
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Internet... with the expected return on investment in triple
digits." 39 Growing along with the Internet, although not at the
same speed, is electronic commerce. 40  Indeed, one of the
principal forces driving the growth of the Internet is its position
as a consumer marketplace. 41
Online commerce presents a completely new method of doing
business that is neither dependent on geographic points of
presence or chains of distribution. Because of the Internet's
interactive, decentralized and open nature, commerce on the
Internet is a multi-billion dollar industry.42 The electronic
commerce industry is projected to grow to $717 billion by the end
of 2001.43 With the advent of "virtual shopping malls" and other
such online resources where users can easily make purchases
from their computer, this growth is not surprising.44
3. How privacy is being invaded on the Internet
As technological advances in the Internet have evolved, the
fundamental right of privacy of the participants has been
compromised.45 Web sites routinely gather data from visitors
39 See Ray Wyman, Virtual Cash: Internet Figures to be E-Cash Medium; Future
Smart Money May Bypass Banks, PUGET SOUND BUS. J., Sept. 22, 1995, at 28 (discussing
future of internet); see also Venture Capital Volume Climbs 54 Percent during 1998"s
First Quarter: Silicon Valley and New England Top $100 Mll'on as Internet Venture
Capital Deals Grow, PR NEWSWIRE, July 15, 1998 (discussing growth in internet
investment), Internet venture Capital Investments Double to $887 Million During Second
Quarter of 1998, BuS. WIRE, Oct. 13, 1998 (discussing boom in internet growth).
40 See Topping, supra note 37, at 193 (discussing the growth rate of commerce on the
Internet).
41 See Choppelas, supra note 31, at 344-46 (discussing effect of growth of on-line
consumer market and its effects on growth of internet); see also Topping, supra note 37,
at 193 (discussing growth rate of commerce on Internet).
42 See Berman & Mulligan, supra note 8, at 552 (discussing decentralized nature of
internet and how it allows all users to 'publish' on it); see also Dan L. Burk, Federalism in
Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (1996) (discussing decentralized nature of
Internet); David R. Johnson, The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370
(1996) (discussing structure of internet).
43 See Gladstone, supra note 6, at 1907.
44 See John P. Collins, Jr., Trying To Board A Moving Volkswagen, 16 YALE L. &
POLeY REV. 535, 538 (1998) (discussing virtual shopping malls and online resources in
which consumers can make purchases on Internet); see also Catherine M. Downey,
Comment, The High Price of a Cashless Society: Exchanging Privacy Rights for Digital
Cash?, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 303, 313-18 (1996) (discussing inherent
risks of online resources where consumers can make purchases).
45 See Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in Electronic
Commerce: Why Self-Regulation Is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REV. 847, 852-55 (1998)
(discussing how right of privacy has been compromised on Internet); Deborah McTigue,
supra note 31, at 5 (1999) (discussing declining privacy rights since internet has become
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overtly collecting information about the habits of their users.
Recording, eavesdropping, collection and dissemination of private
information can now be accomplished with incredible ease as the
line between public and private realms has been blurred.46
Additionally, as a result of the unregulated nature of the Internet
and the sophistication of the technology that supports it,
information flows effortlessly from continent to continent making
effective monitoring of the collection of data nearly impossible. 47
The Internet has hastened the trend of information collection
by simultaneously facilitating the gathering of personal data,
and, by its neural network ability to link immeasurable amounts
of data to a particular individual, making the data more
valuable. 48 Web sites can extract information that the user does
not voluntarily provide, such as the user's e-mail address, the
type of browser being used and even the type of computer being
used.49 Web sites can also obtain information through the use of
"cookies" or "cookie files" which enable web sites to recognize a
repeat visitor and track a specific individual's activities for the
purpose of customizing content and advertising.50
popular); see also Roscoe B. Starek, III, & Lynda M. Rozell, A Cyberspace Perspective:
The Federal Trade Commission's Commitment to Online Consumer Protection, 15 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 679, 680 (1997) (discussing how internet has affected
individual's privacy rights).
46 See Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade In a Land of Perpetual Sualight: Privacy As
Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (Spring 1996) (noting
that use of computers to manage information has blurred delineation between public and
private realms); see also Pippin, supra note 7, at 125-26 (discussing lack of privacy on
internet).
47 See Richard G. Barrows, Internet Ethics, 6 NEV. LAW. 18, 18 (June 1998)
(discussing free flow of information on Internet); see also Hricik, supra note 37, at 463
(discussing how internet is not controlled by one distinct entity).
48 See Vern Countryman, The Diminishing Right Of Pivacy The Personal Dossier
and the Computer, 49 TEX. L. REV. 837, 838 (1971) Professor Countryman asserts:
The computer has further facilitated the quest for efficiency. With its endless capacity to
store data and to regurgitate it with lightening-like speed, it is inefficient not to use the
computer to combine the various dossiers compiled on each individual. If the present
trend continues, the day will come when the push of a button will produce a complete
"data profile" on each citizen, from his departure from the womb (or perhaps sometimes
earlier) to some time after he enters his tomb.
Id. at 838.
49 See Elizabeth deGrazia Blumenfeld, Privacy Please: Will The Internet Industry Act
To Protect Consumer Privacy Before The Government Steps In?9 54 BUS. LAW. 349, 350
(Nov. 1998) (discussing ease of access to consumer information on internet).
50 See Belgum, supra note 5, at 1 n.21 (discussing server's use of cookie technology to
track preferences of users); see also Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1227-28 (1998) (discussing use of cookies by
servers).
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That transactional data, also known as "mouse droppings" or
clickstream data, may then be sorted and reused.51 This
repository of digital fingerprints reveals the blueprint of the
consumer, known as a user profile,52 and can be stored,
aggregated and analyzed to provide a rich source of information
that can later be used by the web site sponsor or sold for profit.53
4. Who is violating our right to privacy and why they are
doing it
When examining who is violating our right to privacy, it
becomes clear that the answer is just about everybody.54 It is
estimated that an astonishing ninety-two percent of web sites
collect personal data.55 To be sure, one recent industry-funded
survey, which involved 361 web sites drawn from the busiest
7,500 servers on the Internet, found that 93 percent of those sites
collected personal information. 56 Interestingly, the gathering
51 See Peter McGrath, Knowing You All Too Well, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 1999, at 48
(discussing recording web movement of users through clickstream data); see also
MICROSOFT PRESS COMPUTER DICTIONARY 286 (3d ed. 1997) (defining clickstream data).
52 See Belgum, supra note 5, at 79 ("Profiling is the term used to denote the
gathering, assembling, and collating of data about individuals in databases which can be
used to identify, segregate, categorize and generally make decisions about individuals
known to the decision-maker only through their computerized profile.").
53 See Belgum, supra note 5, at 79 (defining profiling); see also Charles F. Luce, Jr.,
Internet Privacy Spare And Cookies: How To Avoid Indigestion While Binging At The
World Wide Automat, 27 COLO. LAW. 27, 30 (Oct. 1998) ("The perceived danger to privacy
lies in the possibility of a website combining cookie data with registration data and then
pooling this data with other data to compile a detailed profile of user tastes based on on-
line activities.").
54 See Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in Electronic
Commerce: Why Self-Regulation is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REV. 847, 859 (1998)
(discussing how businesses are covertly collecting information about consumers without
consent); see also Anne Meredith Fulton, Cyberspace And The Internet: Who Will Be The
Privacy Police?, 3 Comm. LAW CONSPECTUS 63, 64 (Winter 1995) (discussing private
nature of internet as source of possible rampant abuse).
55 See FTC, Privacy Online: A Report To Congress (June 1998) (visited October 11,
2001) <http://ww.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/exeintro.htnz> (revealing ninety-two percent of
1,402 web sites surveyed collected some personal data); see also Pippin, supra note 7, at
125 (concluding presence of privacy policy statements does little to safeguard Internet
user's privacy). See generally Jane E. Prine, Torts - No Longer Living In a Glass House:
Every Minnesotan is Entitled to a Right To Privacy, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 999, 1015
(1999) (stating benefits of these technological devices have detrimental effects on person's
right to privacy).
56 See Mary J. Culnan, Georgetown Internet Privacy Policy Survey: Report to the
Federal Trade Commission (last modified August 11, 2000)
<bttp://wwwv.msb.edufaculty/culnann/gppshomie.htmb (reporting results of survey
conducted to provide progress report to FTC on extent to which commercial web sites have
posted privacy disclosures); see also Christine A. Varney, Consumer Privacy in the
Information Age: A View from the United States, 505 PL/PAT 629, 634 (1996) (stating
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and dissemination of personal information for profit is not
limited to the private sector as the government has been making
substantial sums of money from the sale of personal information
of years. 57
The reasons why those various groups collect personal
information are legion. But without a doubt the foremost
motivation is for financial gain. The current market for personal
information is a whopping $1.5 billion per annum. 58 Moreover, it
appears that the online information collection industry has a
bright future "as economic success in industry becomes more
dependent upon having greater quantities and better quality
information."59
that personal information is being collected at rate and to degree unthinkable even five
years ago). See generally Tya Turner, A T&T Sets New Privacy Model, TECH WEB NEWS,
September 24, 1998 (explaining how AT&T has revised its online privacy policies to
reassure customers that personal information will remain within confines of AT&T).
57 See Nina Berstein, On line, High-Tech Sleuths Find Private Facts, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 1997, at A20 (reporting both state and federal governments have used sale of
personal data to boost revenues, specifically Illinois' approximate ten million dollar
annual revenue from sale of private records); see also John Caher, Senate Task Force
Aims to Protect Citizens Privacy, ALBANY TIMES UNION, February 10, 1999 at B2,
(explaining that New York collects more than forty-nine million dollars by selling
information on motorists); see, e.g., Erika S. Koster, Zero Privacy- Personal Data on the
Internet, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, May 1999, at 7 (stating United States Postal Service is
also guilty of selling private information by listing of 108 million permanent change-of-
address cards filed by relocating postal clients to direct marketers).
58 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 776 (Spring 1999) (explaining that companies such as Axciom
and First Data are two such data collection companies that sell information personal
information such as ethnic or religious affiliations and even whether a person buys a
particular type of underwear); see also In the Matter of Trans Union Corporation, FTC
Docket No. 9255, at 53 (July 31, 1998),
<http:/www.ftc.gov/os/198/9898/d9255pub.id.pdf> ("Five companies' revenues represent
40% of this $1.5 billion market: R.L. Polk & Company, ACXIOM, Metromail Corporation,
First Data Solutions and ABI/DBA"). See generally Blumenfeld, supra note 49, at 349
n.14 (arguing there are two ways in which web site can collect personal consumer
information: overtly and clandestinely).
59 See Gladstone, supra note 6, at 1923 ("The electronic commerce industry for
information will continue to expand as economic success in society becomes more
dependent upon having greater quantities and better quality information"); see also Bob
Tedeschi, Targeted Marketing Confronts Privacy Concerns, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, May
10, 1999 (reporting assessment by electronic commerce industry analyst that "[tihe trend
toward capturing and using information is the future of online commerce."); Pippin, supra
note 7, at 126 ("The internet, and specifically the World Wide Web, has become a primary
source for obtaining goods, services, and information by a large number of people in a very
short period of time").
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5. The importance of protecting the right of privacy in online
commercial transactions
Implementing effective safeguards to protect against abuses in
online commercial transactions is critical to the success of
Internet commerce. 60 Even though public disclosure of personal
data is a phenomenon that pre-dates the advent of the
computer, 61 with the creation of the Internet, and its prevalence
in today's society, threats of invasion of privacy, both real and
perceived, have risen to another level.62 Those threats have
greatly hindered the growth of online commerce and the Internet
itself.63 In fact, the foremost reason given by individuals for
refusing to use the Internet was not its cost or technical
complexity, rather it was because of privacy issues.64 Of those
60 See David W. Koch and Meredith Fuchs, Franchisor Survival Guide to Online
Privacy, What Hath Technology Wrought, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 47, 47 (Fall 1999) (stating
that in short period of time, Internet privacy has become significant public concern); see
also Budnitz, supra note 54, at 849 (finding in 1997 Harris survey that majority of
consumers engaging in online activities and Internet transactions are worried about
confidentiality and security of these systems); see, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin and Daniel
L. Appelman, Doing Business In the Digital Era: Some Basic Issues, 570 PLI/PAT 51, 62
(August/September 1999) (explaining how people are worried that if this kind of
information gathering and marketing goes unchecked, everyone who uses credit card or
browses online will be open book).
61 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977) (holding that State of New York
had right to collect names and addresses of all who had purchased prescription drugs); see
also Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
aft'd, 386 F.2d 449, 450 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that statute allowing collection and
disclosure of addresses and telephone numbers of driver's license holders did not
constitute "substantial" violation of privacy rights); Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337,
341 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (allowing sale of publisher's subscription list to direct marketer).
62 See Pippin, supra note 7, at 126-27 (stating hesitation of consumers to conduct on-
line purchasing is uncertainties over how laws and regulations in existence before
emergence of Internet actually apply to Internet commerce, if at all); see also, Hammond,
supra note 4, at 102 (finding that 61% of people surveyed would be more likely to start
using internet if privacy of their personal information and communication would be
protected). But see Varney supra note 56, at 631 (pointing out there is no law or
regulation that establishes citizen's right to informational privacy in United States).
63 See Gladstone, supra note 6, at 1908 (concluding there is consensus among various
industry experts that consumer's desire to be anonymous, or at least unexposed, to
unknown parties has tempered growth of Internet commerce); see, e.g., Budnitz, supra
note 54, at 850-51 (showing that percentage of American households connected to Internet
has doubled in last two years but despite this promising potential market, if consumers do
not trust companies to protect their privacy then companies will generate enough volume
to be profitable).
64 See Hammonds, supra note 4, at 102 (surveying 999 adults and concluding top
reason people are staying off web is to protect their personal information); see also
Budnitz, supra note 54, at 848-49 (finding consumers believe that electronic commerce
systems are capable of invading their privacy and stealing information and this plays
significant factor in consumers' resistance to participate).
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individuals using the Internet, seventy-eight percent stated that
they would use it more if their privacy were guaranteed. 65
The potential economic impact of widespread commercial use of
the Internet is astounding. But as the Internet continues to
evolve as a commercial marketplace, Internet privacy will remain
the primary concern of consumers or potential consumers until
effective measures are taken.66  The development and
implementation of broad privacy protection, therefore, is vital in
terms of fostering the commercial uses of the Internet.67
III. CURRENT INADEQUATE ONLINE PRIVACY
PROTECTIONS
Today there is no comprehensive protection for personal
information in the United States. Commercial web sites are
generally responsible for voluntary compliance or self-regulation
concerning consumer privacy and fair information practices
online. In the absence of any comprehensive legislation, it is
necessary to apply traditional state and federal statutes, caselaw,
regulations and the nebulous "penumbras" of privacy inherent in
the Bill of Rights to consumer transactions on the Internet. But
"[a]pplying existing legal and regulatory paradigms to the
Internet seems to be unavailing."68 There is much confusion as
65 See Hammonds, supra note 4, at 102.
66 See Gladstone, supra note 6, at 1918 (stating that statutory and self-regulatory
mechanisms designed to protect transactional privacy of Internet users have not been
successful); see also Hammonds, supra note 4, at 102 (noting results of survey conducted
in 1998 showing that consumers not currently using Internet ranked concerns about
privacy and communications as biggest reasons they do not use Internet).
67 See Reidenberg, supra note 58, at 771 ("Privacy is a critical issue for the growth of
electronic commerce."); Schultz, supra note 27, at 799 ("The existence of broad privacy
protection is particularly important in terms of furthering commercial uses of the
Internet."); see also Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy In An Information Society, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 707, 738 (1987).
[Glovernment as well as private enterprises have, for far too long, considered the use of
personal data to be the norm. Instead of asking how to perform their task without
resorting to personal information, their interest has concentrated on developing new and
better retrieval methods. Advances in processing have become synonymous with easier
and quicker access to a steadily growing amount of data usable for more and more
purposes. Consequently, where a "convenient" use of computers appears to be the sole
concern, purely technocratic considerations have held sway over all others.
Id. at 738 (footnote omitted).
68 Topping, supra note 37, at 189; see also H. Joseph Hameline and William Miles,
The Dormant Commerce Clause Meets the Internet, 41 B.B.J. 8, 8 (September/October
1997) (examining dormant Commerce Clause and how it is becoming important legal
doctrine at intersection of state law and Internet); see, e.g., United States v. Christopher
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to whether those protections provide any level of informational
privacy protection on the Internet due to a number of factors not
the least of which is the difficulty associated with applying
traditional terminology to modern Internet practice. 69  The
following is a brief description of the online privacy protections
currently in place that are arguably applicable to online
commerce and the reasons why those protections are inadequate.
A. Self-Regulation
Due to the government's lack of desire to provide effective
regulation with regard to online informational privacy, the
United States currently follows a policy of self-regulation
whereby Internet users and operators set the rules and
regulations. Not surprisingly, this approach has been
resoundingly endorsed by "key Internet players."70 But allowing
the industry to regulate itself has been aptly described as like
"the fox watching the hen house."7 ' Notwithstanding the
inherent benefits of a medium free from government
interference, 72 it is abundantly clear that the current relaxed
self-regulatory structure is simply not working and legislation is
needed.73
B. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1997) (stating that Internet is equivalent to moving
photographs across state lines and this constitutes transportation in interstate
commerce).
69 See Fulton, supra note 54, at 64 ("The rapid growth of computer technology has left
the law in the dust. There are limited laws regulating Cyberspace, and many of its users
and program activities remain unchecked."). But see FTC, supra note 55, at
<http.'//wwv.ftc.govl'/eportsprivacy3/exeint o.htm> (explaining that several regulatory
initiatives have been formed to protect overall privacy interests of individuals that use
Internet).
70 See Gladstone, supra note 6, at 1916 (noting that government's laissez-fair
approach to regulating Internet by allowing private sector to take lead has been endorsed
by Internet community); see, e.g., Topping supra note 68, at 181 (explaining framework of
Internet Tax Freedom Act that was signed into law by President Clinton in 1998 which
addresses economic potential of Internet and endorsed its lack of legal framework).
71 Pippin, supra note 7, at 131.
72 Id. at 131 (stating that skeptics of governmental intervention contend that "the
local, state, and federal government are all incapable of implementing effective rules and
enforcement mechanisms, due partially to the speed at which technology is advancing")
(footnote omitted); see also David W. Carney, Online Privacy Bill Runs Aground,
TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL (July 27, 1999)
<http://w. vtechlawyournalcom/privacy/19990727htbm> (quoting from Senator John
McCain, Chairman of the Commerce Committee, "[In fact, regulation could impede
development and deployment of new technology that may empower consumers to protect
their own privacy.")
73 See Pippin, supra note 7, at 133 (stating that "[w]ith so many different approaches
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In order to stave-off federal regulation many prominent
Internet companies have already implemented policies designed
to increase consumer confidence. 74 Additionally, various privacy
self-regulation organizations have been created to address the
issue.75 For instance, in 1998, the Commerce Department and
The National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, which advises the Secretary of Commerce and
the President of the United States on domestic and international
communications issues, jointly released a discussion draft of a
report entitled "Elements of Effective Self-Regulation for
Protection of Privacy" (the "Report").76 The Report recommended
that online consumers should be informed of the identity of the
collectors of personal information and the intended use of the
information. 77 The Report also recommended that businesses
to the problem of Internet privacy, self-regulation has not yet proven to be the best
possible solution."); Reidenberg, supra note 58, at 787 (observing "lessons from the
American experience with self-regulation show that the government cannot abdicate
responsibility for the protection of citizens' privacy to a marketplace skewed in favor of
the sale of personal information"); see also Jeri Clausing, After Intel Cl'p's Debut, Critics
Step Up Attack, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, Feb. 19, 1999 (noting numerous privacy
watchdog organizations have been highly critical of self-regulation and failure of federal
government to take affirmative steps to increase online privacy protection).
74 See Stephen J. Davidson & Katheryn A. Andersen, The UCITA Revolution: The
New E-Commerce Model for Software and Database Licensing, 600 PLI/PAT 553, 561
(April/May 2000) (describing Better Business Bureau's creation of certification program
for Internet business' privacy programs, which guarantees consumers that such programs
provide appropriate privacy safeguards); Radin & Appelman, supra note 60, at 64 (noting
that important Internet sites are promulgating privacy policies in hope of avoiding federal
or state regulation); Domingo R. Tan, supra note 9, at 674 & n.84 (listing Adobe, BPI
Communications, CBS, CNET, Collier Newfield, ConEx, Digimarc, MSNBC, Playboy
Enterprises New Media Group, Sony On-line Ventures, IBM, AT&T, and the New York
Times as companies using their own seals of approval to promote consumer confidence in
on-line transactions).
75 See Michael A. Geist, Web Watch: Online Privacy: An Integral Part Of Electronic
Commerce, 2 No. 9 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELEC. AGE 29 (1999) (naming Online
Privacy Alliance, 'OPA," as leading privacy self-regulation organization, comprised of 70
global corporations and associations working together to foster improved privacy
protections online without government interference); Julia Alpert Gladstone, Does the EC
Council Directive No. 95/46/EC Mandate the Use of Anonymous Digital Currency?, 22
FORDHAM IN'L L.J. 1907, 1917 (1999) (naming Smart Card Forum as another
organization that developed its own set of privacy guidelines to protect consumer privacy
expectations); Richard D. Harroch, Legal Issues Associated with the Creation and
Operation of Web Sites, 610 PLI/PAT 537, 586 (2000) (listing Individual Reference
Services Group, "IRSG," as another self-regulatory privacy organization that collects and
distributes personal information).
76 See 63 FED. REG. 30,729 (June 5, 1998).
77 See 63 FED. REG. 30,731; see also Lee S. Adams & David J. Martz, Development in
Stored-Value Cards and Cyberbanking, 54 BUS. LAW. 1373, 1383 (1999) (Report
recommends self-regulatory procedures enable consumers to choose how personal
information is used); Belgum, supra note 5, at 65 (citing Report as requiring "Awareness"
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provide consumers with the opportunity to choose whether and
how their personal information is used.78 But the government
never implemented the proposals set forth in the Report.
Recently, however, on July 27, 2000, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") voted 4-1 to endorse a self-regulatory plan
submitted by the Network Advertising Initiative ("NAI"), a
consortium comprised of more than 90 percent of Internet
advertising companies. 79  The self-regulatory plan requires
advertising companies on the Internet to detail their data
collection policies and give consumers the opportunity to opt-out
of data collection efforts.8 0 The advertising companies also
promised to give consumers "reasonable access" to personally
identifiable information collected about them and to make
"reasonable efforts" to protect the data they collect. 81
But privacy advocates immediately criticized the self-
regulatory plan stating that it does not go far enough to ensure
that personal information collected online about consumers will
not be misused because it places the burden on the consumer to
"opt-out" of the data collection procedures, it fails to provide for
any penalty if companies fail to follow the guidelines and it fails
to guarantee compliance by advertising firms that are not
or disclosure of identity of data collecting party and means for avoiding participating in
such transactions).
78 See 63 FED. REG. 30,731 see also Belgum, supra note 5, at 65 (citing Report as
requiring "Choice," or mechanism to exercise options such as "affirmative choice" for
certain "sensitive" categories of information); Scott Killingsworth, Minding Your Own
Business: Privacy Policies in Principle andin Practice, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 68 (1999)
(citing Report as articulating elements of "Fair Information Practices" which represent
consensus approach to personal information privacy that allows consumers to participate
in decisions on disclosure and use of personal information).
79 See Lori A. Schecter & Andrew D. Muhlbach, Privacy on the Internet: A Legal
Framework, 618 PLIIPAT 739, 755 (2000) (listing NAI members, including 24/7 Media,
AdForce, AdKnowledge, Avenue A, Burst! Media, Double Click, Engage and MatchLogic).
See generally, Jules Polonetsky, Networking Advertising Initiative: Self Regulatory
Principles for Online Preference Marketing by Network Advertisers, 618 PLTIPAT 795,
789 (2000) (giving full copy of NAI Plan).
80 See Schecter & Muhlbach, supra note 79, at 756-57 (stating NAI Plan requires user
to exercise choice of how personal information is used for purposes unrelated to its
collection, and that user is given, at a minimum, choice to opt-out); Polonetsky, supra note
79, at 792 (identifying NAI's requirement of posting detailed data collection policies and
making available opt-out policies).
81 See Schecter & Muhlbach, supra note 79, at 747 (stating NAI Plan requires
advertisers to establish mechanisms such as consumer access and use of reliable sources
to assyre accuracy of personal information; see also Polonetsky, supra note 79, at 800
(stating NAI Plan requires advertisers to make "reasonable efforts" to protect the data
they collect for OPM from loss, misuse, alteration, destruction or improper access).
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members of the NAI.82 While the FTC never stated that the
Network Advertising Initiative is the privacy model the FTC
seeks for all online commerce, "federal officials have suggested
that it comes close."8 3
Although certain online businesses and reform groups have
established, or promise to establish, their own privacy guidelines,
the government, Internet users, and numerous online businesses
agree that self-regulation has failed.8 4 Even the FTC, on the
very same day it approved and publicly supported the NAI's self-
regulatory plan, announced that it still intended to pursue
privacy legislation in Congress.S5 Because of the inherent
shortcomings of self-regulation and the apparent need for new
legislation, it is plainly a question of whether or not the
government is willing to follow through with its threat of
intervention.
82 See Jessica Melugin, Double-Click for Consumers, WASHINGTON TIMES, August 1,
2000, at A18 (noting consumers' absence from negotiating table results in lack of benefits
to consumers); Striking The Wrong Balance, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 14, 2000, at B2
(arguing FTC has sold out public while caving into marketers in endorsing "anemic" plan
to govern online privacy); see also Good News Monday; Privacy - OnLine Protections,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 31, 2000, at A10 ("While [the Network Advertising Initiative
is] looking in the right direction, it doesn't go far enough to give consumers truly informed
choices," quoting Ari Schwartz of Center for Democracy and Technology); John Solomon,
FTC Backs Privacy Plan for Net Users: Advertisers Will Self-Regulate Web Profiling,
CHICAGO TIMES, July 28, 2000, at B1 (recognizing privacy advocates' fear of misuse or
transmission of gathered information to third parties without online users' consent).
83 See Joanna Ramey, E-Tailers See Possible Privacy Ills, WWD, Aug. 1, 2000, at 2;
see also Lesley Anne Fair, Federal Trade Commission Advertising Enforcement, 808
PLIlCOMM 267, 304 (2000) (noting FTC's approval of NAI's self-regulation plan). But see
E- Commerce/Technology, 21 JUD./LEG. WATCH REP. 2, 2 (2000) (noting FTC's approval of
NAI's "guidelines," but also noting FTC's recent report communicating need for legislation
to protect consumers).
84 See Reidenberg, supra note 58, at 776 (noting U.S. government's recognition of
hypothetical self-regulation in corporate America); Trubow, supra note 9, at 832 (stating
internet users have reached consensus that self-regulation is not enough); Eric J. Sinrod
et al., Comment, The New Wave of Speech and Privacy Developments in Cyberspace, 21
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 583, 598 (1999) (noting civil rights and privacy
organizations' skepticism of industry efforts at self-regulation); Gladstone, supra note 6,
at 1918 (asserting "The evidence suggests that the statutory and self-regulatory
mechanisms designed to protect the transactional privacy of Internet users have not yet
been successful").
85 See Ramey, supra note 83, at 2; E- Commerce/Technology, supra note 83, at 2
(noting FTC' s approval of NAI's "guidelines," but also noting FTC's recent report
communicating need for legislation to protect consumers).
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B. Constitutional Protections
1. The United States Constitution
There are two amendments to the United States Constitution
that indirectly address privacy issues relating to online
commerce-The First Amendment which prohibits laws
abridging the freedom of speech, assembly, or the press; and the
Fourth Amendment which protects people from unreasonable
government intrusion. 86 But privacy protections provided by the
Constitution are limited by the state action requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment.8 7 Under the state action requirement,
the constraints on access to information imposed by the
Constitution only apply to governmental entities and not to the
private sector.88 Thus, the Constitution protects a citizen's right
of privacy from unlawful intrusion by the government, but does
not protect citizens from privacy invasions committed by private
citizens.89
86 See infra nn. 87-99 & accompanying text (discussing First and Fourteenth
Amendments of U.S. Constitution); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing Freedom of
Speech and Freedom of Press); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses).
87 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing, in pertinent part "nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws") (emphasis added); see also
Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer's Fiftieth Anniversary: "A Time For Keeping, A
Time for Throwing Away," 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 62-63 (1998) (arguing private racial
discrimination be addressed using alternatives to state action doctrine such as public
policy, balancing of conflicting rights, and legislative enactments to prevent further
clouding line between state and private action). See generally Kevin L. Cole, Federal and
State "State Action ": The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L.
REV. 327, 328-30 (1990) (further discussing "state action" doctrine from both state and
federal perspective).
88 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (noting Fourteenth
Amendment provides "essential dichotomy... between deprivation by the State, subject
to scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful,
against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield"); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 13 (1948) (noting Fourteenth Amendment erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful); see also Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (laying out two-part test for determining state action: first,
deprivation must be caused by exercise of some right or privilege created by State or by
rule of conduct imposed by State or by person for whom State is responsible; and second,
party charged with deprivation must be person who is clearly a State actor).
89 See Robert J. Glennon & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth
Amendment "State Action" Requiremen4 1976 SuP. CT. REV. 221, 232-33 (1976); Saxer,
supra note 84, at 61-62 (characterizing Shelley v. Kraemer decision as blurring line
between state action which is subject to constitutional restrictions, and private action
which is not). See generally Cole, supra note 87, at 330 (1990) (further discussing "state
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The First Amendment, which limits the government's power to
collect data where the government's involvement would interfere
with the ability to publish or distribute speech, provides some
level of informational privacy regarding defamatory speech. 90
The First Amendment, as it relates to defamation, has little
applicability in online privacy because most of the private
information that is disclosed to commercial web sites is true, thus
negating the element of falsity required by defamation statutes.91
Additionally, in New York Times Co. v. Sulivan,92 the United
States Supreme Court held that for a public official to prevail in
a defamation suit, the public figure must demonstrate that the
statement is false and was made with actual malice.93 As such,
the Court severely limited the applicability of common law
privacy torts in cases involving newsworthy individuals. 94
action" doctrine from both state and federal perspective).
90 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing, in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances"). But see
Rhonda G. Hartman, 71 OR. L. REV. 855, 874 (1992) (stating defamatory and
discriminatory hate speech should not be allowed to "demean the grand conception of the
First Amendment," quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973)). See generally
Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Pivacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People
by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1579 (1979); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the
First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1209 (1976) (both discussing privacy in
context of free speech).
91 Compare CAL. CIV. CODE 45 (West 2000) (defining libel as "a false and
unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation
to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which
causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his
occupation) (emphasis added) and GA. CODE ANN. 45 (West 2000) (defining libel as "a
false and malicious defamation of expressed in print, writing, pictures, or signs, tending
to injure the reputation of the person and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule) (emphasis added), with N. Y. CONST. art. 1 (providing, in pertinent part, "[I1n all
criminal prosecutions or indictments for libels,...if it shall appear to the jury that the
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for
justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted.") (emphasis added). But see Rhonda G.
Hartman, 71 OR. L. REV. 855, 874 (1992) (stating "[wihen private speech threatens civility
of a society directly.. or indirectly, as through discriminatory acts injurious to reputation
or privacy, the threat of deleterious effect arguably need not be tolerated;
defamatory.. .speech should not be allowed to 'demean the grand conception of the First
Amendment," quotingMiller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 34 (1973)).
92 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
93 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283 (creating actual malice standard for defamation
actions brought by public officials); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974)
(extending actual malice standard for defamation actions brought by private figures on
matters of public concern). But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985) (refusing to extend actual malice standard to statements of non-
public concern.
94 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283 (requiring actual malice); see also John J. Walsh,
Damages: Will They Be DitTerent in the New Millenzium 523 PLI/PAT 297, 304 (1998)
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Therefore, "the First Amendment provides little, if any, privacy
protection for personal information collected by web site
operators."95
The Fourth Amendment also provides only limited protections
against the invasion of privacy.96 The Supreme Court first
recognized a constitutional right for information privacy in
Whalen v. Roe.97 In this 1977 case, the Court upheld a state
statute that required doctors to disclose information to the state
on individuals taking certain highly addictive prescription drugs
for inclusion on a state database. 98 Although the Court upheld
the statute, it affirmed an individual's right to have his personal
information protected by the government stating that "[biroad
dissemination by state officials of such information, however,
would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy
rights. . . ." 99
Even though the Supreme Court recognized a Constitutional
right to informational privacy, it has repeatedly noted the
absence of constitutional protection for information that
individuals place into the flow of commerce or otherwise
(noting extension of Sullivan protection beyond defamation law to common law torts
involving newsworthy expression in Time Inc. v. HiL, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)). But see
Pfannenstiel v. Osborne Publishing Co., 939 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Kan. 1996) (noting Gertz
cast HiE into doubt by "depart[ing] from precedent and decid[ing] that a private
individual alleging defamation against media defendant need not prove actual malice to
satisfy the First Amendment").
95 Blumenfeld, supra note 49, at 355.
96 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, house, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
97 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 606. The Whalen Court also held with respect to an individual's right to
privacy protection from the government:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts
of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government files.
The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the
supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of
the criminal laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of information,
much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if
disclosed. The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted
disclosures.
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voluntarily disclose.l00 Although it certainly can be argued that
online users have certain privacy interests in the online world
even when voluntarily disclosing private information, as the
United States Supreme Court held in Katz, the Fourth
Amendment "protects people not places."101 In other words, what
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.102
Consequently, the Supreme Court's decision in Katz and its
progeny leads to the conclusion that the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to protect online consumers from the dissemination of
their private information because they voluntarily exposed that
information to the public.103
2. State constitutional privacy protections
Like the United States Constitution, the great majority of state
constitutions do not expressly provide a right to privacy although
they do offer protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 104  However, judicial interpretations of those state
constitutional provisions, like those interpreting the United
States Constitution, have limited the privacy right to protect only
against government intrusions.105  Also, states are severely
hampered in their efforts to protect the privacy of individuals
engaging in interstate commerce because of the Internet's
100 See United States v. Miler, 425 U. S. 435, 442-47 (1976) (holding that there is no
expectation of privacy when bank discloses customer's records after being served with
subpoena); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 742 (1979) (holding that there is no
expectation of privacy for phone records dialed into telephone); see also Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, (1978) (reiterating that one who voluntarily discloses something to another
assumes risk of losing Fourth Amendment protection).
101 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring). Jed Rubenfeld, The Right Of
Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, (1989) (discussing evolution of right to under Warren
court).
102 See Katz, 389 U. S. at 351-52. see Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law,
89 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1980) (noting that privacy has different meanings in different
contexts).
103 See e.g., Randolph S. Sergent, Note, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer
Networks and Data Privacy, 81 VA. L. REV. 1181, (1995) (PARA). See also Joe Baladi,
Note, Building Castles Made out of Glass, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 251, n.189
(1999) (discussing internet's relation to 4th Amendment's reasonable expectation of
privacy).
104 Julie A. Flanagan, Note, Restricting Electronic Monitoring in the Private
Workplace, 43 DUKE L.J. 1256, 1264-65 (1994) (PARA).
105 Id. See United States v. Gori, 230 F. 3d 44, 50 (outlining Supreme Court's
historical limitations on privacy rights).
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inherently a-jurisdictional nature that makes acquiring
jurisdiction to impose sanctions on violators difficult if not
impossible. 0 6
C. Federal Information Privacy Statutes
Although the United States does not have an omnibus law that
governs the treatment of personal information over the Internet,
Congress has passed certain federal statutes and regulations to
control the collection, use and dissemination of information in
particular industries. Nevertheless, only a few of those statutes
afford any protection to online consumers. The primary federal
statutes that may be interpreted as providing some level of
privacy protection to online consumers are the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986107 and the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.108 Several other federal statutes may also play a
minor role in safeguarding the rights of online consumers, but
none provide the broad legislation needed to halt, or at least
curtail, the involuntary collection and use of personal
information in online commercial transactions.
1. The Electronic Communications Pivacy'Act of 1986
In an effort to address the privacy concerns attendant to newly
developing electronic technology, Congress passed the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA").109 The ECPA is
currently the only federal statute that specifically addresses
106 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1996) ("Conventional doctrines of jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate and to enforce
legal decisions must evolve to handle new disputes in cyberspace."); John A. Lowther IV,
Comment, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet Quagmire: Amputating Judicially
Created Long-Arms, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 619, 653 (1998) ("Our ancient and outdated
notions of geography, territory, and presence have finally met their match against an
entity that has no geography, is not confined to any one territory, and gives everyone an
instant presence everywhere.").
107 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711 (1994). But see Jay Krasovec, Cyberspace: The Final
Frontier, for Regulation, 31 AKRON L. REV. 101, 139 (1997) (discussing alternatives to
government regulation of internet)
108 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1994). L. Bryan Burns, Bakker v. Mckinnon: Attorney
Faces Punitive Damagesfor Obtaining Credit Reports on Adverse Litigant, 53 ARK L. REV.
73, 77 (2000) (discussing historical development of Fair Credit Reporting Act).
109 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711 (1994). The ECPA amended Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 which was essentially an "anti-wiretapping"
act that targeted governmental eavesdropping of telephone conversations.
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interception and access of electronic communications. The ECPA
prohibits unauthorized access, interception or disclosure of
electronic communications 110  including data transmissions
between computers, pagers, e-mail and video transmissions.1 11
The ECPA is a complex statute that provides important privacy
protections because it imposes harsh penalties, both crimina 112
and civil, 113 for violation of the statute.114
But the ability of the ECPA to provide protection in the online
commercial realm is uncertain because the government has
heretofore been reluctant to bring such suits under the
statute.115  Furthermore, the breadth of the ECPA is not
sufficient to protect all forms of online information abuse. For
instance, because the ECPA only extends to the contents of
communications, transactional information associated with
electronic communications, such as the existence of
communications, identities of the parties, the length of the
message, duration of the communication and the length of the
message are not protected. 1l6 Additionally, the ECPA is mostly
110 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994) (defining electronic communication as "any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photolectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce. . .
111 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510.
112 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a).
113 See 18 U.S.C. § 2520; see also Shubert v. Metrophone, 898 F. 2d 401, 402 (3d Cir.
1990) (describing class action where consumers sought to bring class action for civil
damages against cellular phone service provider for disclosing "the contents of their
cellular mobile phone communications"); Steve Miller, Washington's Spam-Killing
Statute. Does it Slaughter Privacy in the Process?, 74 WASH. L REV. 453, 460 (1999)
(stating that violations of EPCA may result in civil damages, frees, and sometimes
imprisonment).
114 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2520, 2701, 2707 (1994); see also Miller, supra note 109, at
460 (stating same); Shubert, supra note 109, at 402 (stating same).
115 See Maureen S. Dorney, Shaping the Future: Law, Electronic Commerce, and the
[Superhighway] Ahead, 19 HASTINGS COMMENT. L.J. 635, 645 (1997) (stating that
criminal suits brought under ECPA are scarce and "[i]t is unclear whether government
prosecutors will be interested in disputes between systems operators, employers, and
users."). See generally Bryan S. Schultz, Electronic Money, Internet Commere, and the
Right to Financial Privacy: A Call for New Federal Guidelines, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 779,
796 (1999) (stating that although EPCA provides significant privacy protection to various
types of transactions, its scope limits its applicability to information abuse problems
presented by online transactions).
116 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520, 2521, 2707 (1986). A service provider is, however,
prohibited from knowingly divulging the contents of the communication. See 18 U.S.C.
§2702(a)(1). This distinction between context and content is important in understanding
the scope of the ECPA. See also Miller, supra note 109, at 461-62 (stating that although
EPCA regulates disclosure of contents of electronic message, it "does not prohibit
disclosure of information unrelated to the content of the message").
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limited to communications stored for less than 180 days.117
Thus, although the ECPA provides significant privacy protection
to certain types of electronic transactions, its limited scope
severely limits its applicability to the information abuse
problems now faced by online consumers.
2. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
Another piece of legislation that may provide some privacy
protection to online consumers is the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA"), which establishes important privacy protections for
consumers' sensitive financial information by governing the
ability of consumer credit reporting agencies to disclose personal
information in supplying credit information. 118
The FCRA is important to the online consumer because credit
report information is becoming increasingly accessible on the
Internet as more users make online purchases with their credit
cards.11 9 The FCRA restricts the disclosure of consumer credit
reports and other personal information to entities with particular
"permissible purposes," such as eligibility for personal credit or
insurance, employment purposes, and licensing.120 The FCRA
117 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); Schultz, supra note 111, at 796, (NEED PARA). But see
Michael S. Leib, Email and Wiretap Laws: Why Congress Should Add Electronic
Communication to Title III Statutory Exclusionary Rule and Expressly Reject a Good
Faith Exception, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 405-07 (1997) (stating that government may
obtain communication stored for more than 180 days through warrant, administrative
subpoena, grand subpoena, or court order).
118 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). See also Fernandez v. Retail Credit Co., 349 F. Supp.
652, 653 (1972) (stating that FCRA limits circumstances under which "consumer report"
may be furnished by consumer reporting agency); see Mangio v. Equifax, 887 F. Supp.
283, 284 (1995) (describing EPCA as requiring that consumer reporting agencies adopt
reasonable procedures for ensuring accuracy of credit information that they collect and
report on individuals).
119 See Gladstone, supra note 6, at 1909. When purchasing goods or services over
the Internet by credit card, the customer must either e-mail his credit card/personal
identification details to the merchant or enter the credit card information on the
merchant's web page thereby necessarily exposing private information. Id. Making an
online purchase with cash provides the most privacy protection during an online
transaction as it is fungible, largely untraceable and no additional assurance of
authenticity is needed. However, making a payment by cash presents other obvious
obstacles such as the need for an instantaneous method of payment.
120 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(e). The FCRA provides in relevant part:
Every consumer reporting agency shall maintain reasonable procedures designed to avoid
violations of § 1681(c) of this title and to limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the
purposes listed under § 1681(b) of this title. These procedures shall require that
prospective users of the information identify themselves, certify the purposes for which
the information is sought, and certify that the information will be used for no other
purpose. Every consumer reporting agency shall make a reasonable effort to verify the
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provides compensatory damages and attorneys' fees for negligent
noncompliance and punitive damages for willful
noncompliance. 1 2 The FTC is endowed with the administrative
powers to enforce the FCRA pursuant to the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 122
The authority granted under the FCRA has been limited,
however, by the courts' interpretation of a "consumer report."123
For example, in Thans Union Corp. v. FTC,124 the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit overturned an FTC order
that Trans Union Corporation's sale of "targeted marketing"
mailing lists was a consumer report for an impermissible purpose
under the FCRA.125 The FTC contended that the mailing lists
identity of a new prospective user and the uses certified by such prospective user prior to
furnishing such user a consumer report. No consumer reporting agency may furnish a
consumer report to any person if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the
consumer report will not be used for a purpose listed in § 1681(b) of this title.
Id.
121 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(o) & (n). See Thorton v. Equifax, Inc., 619 F. 2d 700, 703
(1980) (stating that FCRA provides when violations of statute are willful, damages
recovered can be actual and punitive, and plaintiff may also recover attorney fees);
Mangio v. Equifax, 887 F. Supp. 283, 284 (1995) (stating that individuals may sue for
damages if credit agency willfully fails to comply with its FCRA obligations, rendering
agency liable to individual for his or her actual damages as court will allow).
122 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(s); see also Mangio, 887 F. Supp. at 285 (stating that
Congress granted FTC power to sue individual creditors for injunctive relief; under
FCRA's administrative enforcement provision, credit agencies "compliance" with FCRA
shall be enforced by FTC. Violations of FCRA constitute unfair or deceptive acts under
FTCA).
123 Under the FCRA, a consumer report is defined as:
Any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer
reporting agency bearing on a consumer's characteristics, or mode of living
which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the
purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for (a)
credit or insurance, (b) employment purposes or (c) any other purpose
authorized under § 1681(b).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)&(d); see also St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 884 F. 2d
881, 883 (1989) (PARA); Hovater v. Equifax, Inc., 823 F. 2d 413, 417 (1987) (holding on
basis of Congressional intent, that report which insurer procures from credit reporting
agency solely for use in evaluating insured individual's claim for benefits under existing
policy is not consumer report subject to regulatory provisions of FCRA).
124 81 F. 3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
125 See Trans Union, 81 F. 3d at 229 (PARA); Hovater, 823 F. 2d at 418 (explaining
that FCRA limits permissible purposes to occasions when agency is subject to court order,
acting with consent of consumer, or performing service for agency who reasonably believes
that information is to be used to determine eligibility for insurance, credit, license or
other governmental instrumentality, for employment purposes or other legitimate
business purpose); see Heath v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan, Inc., 618 F. 2d 693, 696
(YEAR) (stating that pursuant to statute, permitted purposes to which protected
information must relate, must be about consumer transaction, and therefore information
not supplied to person not engaged in such transaction cannot be consumer report).
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were consumer reports because they were compiled using credit
account data.126 The Trans Union court held that the mailing
lists were not consumer reports because the "implicit information
conveyed therein" was not collected "to serve as a factor in
determining credit eligibility."127 The narrow interpretation of
what constitutes a "consumer report" by the courts has severely
limited the applicability of the FCRA.128 Furthermore, under the
FCRA, agencies are not required to notify individuals of the
existence, content, or use of financial records. "Thus, the FCRA
provides little privacy protection" to online consumers.129
3. Other federal privacy legislation
Other federal acts protecting informational privacy include: the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which prohibits unauthorized
access of computers under certain circumstances; 130
the Federal Records Act, which regulates the disposal of
federal records;131 the Right to Financial Privacy Act, which
prohibits access to financial records of individuals by government
authorities;132 the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,
which regulates telemarketing practices; 133 and the Electronic
126 See Trans Union, 81 F. 3d at 230 (stating that information used implicitly
transformed Trans Union lists into consumer reports).
127 See id., at 230.
128 See id., at 229; see also Ippolito v. WNS, Inc., 864 F. 2d 440, 451 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that definition of "consumer report" in § 1681(a) is limited to information used in
connection with business transaction involving one of consumer purposes set out in
statute, that is, eligibility for personal credit or insurance, employment purposes and
licensing).
129 See Wigod, supra note 33, at 123 (PARA). For a comprehensive examination of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, see Captain Julie J. R. Huygen, After the Deal is Done:
Debt Collection and Credit Reporting, 47 A. F. L. REV. 89, JC (1999) (PARA)..
130 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
131 See 44 U.S.C. § § 2101-2118 (1994). See generally Sandra Sanders, Note,
Arizona's Public Records Laws and the Technology Age: Applying "Paper" Laws to
Computer Records, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 945 (1995) (explaining Federal Records Act);
Catherine F. Sheehan, Note, Opening the Government's Electronic Mail: Public Access to
National Security Council Records, 35 B. C. L. REV. 1145, 1166 (1994) (discussing Act's
purpose of providing for efficient government and allowing private researchers to access
federal records).
132 See 12 U.S.C. § § 3401-13 (1994). See generally Major R. Ken Pippin, Consumer
Privacy on the Internet: It's "Surfer Beware", 47 A. F. L. REV. 125, 151 (1999) (stating
that Act provides some confidentiality concerning financial records of depositors by
governing transfer of financial records); Joseph J. Darby, Confidentiality and the Law of
Taxation, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 577, 587 (1998) (stating that Financial Privacy Act requires
federal agencies to satisfy procedural requirements).
133 See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1998). See generally Gary S. Moorefield, Note, SPAM - It's
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Communications Privacy Act of 1986,134 which prohibits, among
other things, the intentional interception of electronic
communications and the intentional access of stored electronic
communications. 135 Each of those statutes, however, falls short
in addressing the unique concerns of online commerce. In fact,
most of the privacy statutes appeal to the privacy concerns of the
past and as such, fail to provide adequate safeguards against the
prevailing privacy threats in today's electronic marketplace.
In addition to the inapplicability of the federal privacy
statutes, even where information is covered by legislation, there
is no central administrative agency to monitor compliance. The
numerous agencies responsible for monitoring certain privacy
issues include the Federal Trade Commission, the Office of
Consumer Affairs, the Office of Management and Budget, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Social Security
Administration, the Department of Health and Human Services,
the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Reserve Board, and
the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration. 136  But although there are several federal
agencies that oversee certain privacy issues, the power of those
Not Just for Breakfast Anymore: Federal Legislation and the Fight to Free the Internet
from Unsolicitated Commercial E-mail, 5 B.U. J. SCd. & TECH. L. 10, para. 10 (1999)
(stating that autodialer messages are invasions of privacy); Howard E. Berkenblit, Note,
Can Those Telemarketing Machines Keep Calling Me? - The Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991 Ailer Moser v. FCC, 36 B.C.L. REV. 85, 85 (1994) (explaining that it
is unlawful to initiate any telephone calls to residential telephones by artificial or
prerecorded voices under Act).
134 See 18 U.S.C. § § 2510-20, 2701-09 (1999); see also Lt. Col. LeEllen Coacher,
Permitting Systems Protection Monitoring: When the Government Can Look and What it
Can See, 46 A. F. L. REV. 155, 157 (stating that E.C.P.A. extended federal wiretap laws to
include interception and accession of electronic forms of communication); Jarrod J. White,
Commentary, E-Mail/Work.Cmo: Employer Monitoring of Employee E-Mail, 48 ALA. L.
REV. 1079, 1080-81 (1997) (stating that ECPA provides statutory framework for electronic
communications).
135 See Wigod, supra note 33, at 123-26 (discussing above statutes and other federal
statutes addressing privacy issues); Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found Cyberspace:
Informational Prvacy in the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1196
(Summer 1997) (stating same); see also Pippin, supra note 7, at 147 (discussing various
governmental agencies that monitor compliance).
136 See generally Barbara S. Wellbery, "For Your Eyes Only" Means What in the
Cyber Age? The Gap Between What "Pivacy" Means in the U.S. Versus the European
Union Must Be Addressed, ABA BANKING J., Dec. 1, 1997 at 30, 34-38 (discussing sectoral
roles played by various governmental agencies); Jacqueline Marcucci, Note, The Brave
New World of Banking on the Internet: The Revolution of Our Banking Practices, 23
NOVA L. REV. 739, 750 (1999) (explaining role of regulatory agencies); Kimbrelly Kegler,
Note, Electronic Banking: Security, Privacy, and CRA Compliance, 2 N.C. BANKING INST.
426, 450-51 (1998) (discussing other agencies that enforce privacy guidelines).
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agencies is limited in that their authority relates to issue-specific
concerns. Additionally, the various agencies do not coordinate
their efforts making privacy protection even more problematic.
D. Common Law
Tort law is the traditional means of redressing violations of
privacy interests. Although the common law torts are collectively
known as the invasion of privacy, they are actually four separate
and distinct such common law torts.137 Those torts are: (1)
intrusion upon seclusion;138 (2) public disclosure of private
facts;139 (3) false light;140 and (4) misappropriation of name or
likeness for commercial purposes. 141 But, as discussed briefly
137 See Prosser, supra note 26, at (declaring that there are four separate and distinct
common law torts under broad purview of invasion of privacy). See also Prosser & Keeton,
Handbook on the Law of Torts, Ch. 20 (5th ed. 1984) (providing comprehensive review of
four common law torts comprising common law of privacy); Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, An
Affront to Human Dignigz: Electronic Mail Monitoring in the Private Sector Workplace, 8
HARv. J. L. & TECH. 345, 374 (1995) (explaining four distinct torts protecting right to
privacy).
138 Intrusion upon seclusion imposes liability on "one who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(b) (1977). Under this theory, an invasion
is not considered intrusive unless it would be highly offensive to the reasonable person.
Id. at cmt. c. Moreover,. if the information intruded upon was voluntarily disclosed to the
public, the seclusion right hasn't been violated. Id. at cmt. d. For instance, in Dwyer v.
American Express Co., 652 N. E .2d 1351, JC (Ill. App. 1995), the court held that
American Express had not violated the tort of intrusion upon seclusion when American
Express had collected and sold information from its cardholders determining that the
intrusion was tacitly authorized because the cardholder "voluntarily and necessarily"
gave the information to American Express by using the card. Id. at 1356. The tort most
relevant to E-mail interception or accession is the "unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another" tort. Gantt, supra note 133, at 374.
139 Under the public disclosure of private facts tort, there must be public disclosure
(the disclosure must be such that the private fact is "substantially certain to become of
public knowledge") of private facts (those facts a reasonable person would find the
disclosure of highly offensive). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(d) (1977). The
Restatement provides numerous examples of the type of information protected from
disclosure: income tax returns, sexual relations and "unpleasant or disgraceful or
humiliating illnesses." Id. Liability under the disclosure branch of invasion of privacy can
be produced if an electronic bulletin board organizes and encourages users to disseminate
E-mail messages obtained without the consent of the sender and addressee. Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability. The First Amendment, and Equal Access to Electronic
Networks, 5 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 65, 109 (1992)..
140 Under the false light tort, one who gives publicity to a matter concerning another
that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in a reckless disregard as to the falsity
of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(e) (1977).
141 The misappropriation tort applies when someone's name or likeness is used
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below, the privacy torts have limited applicability in the online
commercial world.
The torts of intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of
private facts are rejected as a solution to online privacy concerns
because most of the personal information obtained online is
provided voluntarily by the user. Furthermore, "plaintiffs
repeatedly lose such cases upon a showing that the fact in
question was already in the public domain where, for example, it
was obtained from a public record or other source outside the
plaintiff's control, or obtained from the plaintiff directly while in
a public place."'142 The tort of false light is inapt because it
requires an element of falsity.143 Because an online consumer's
primary concern with respect to online privacy is that too much
information will be disclosed, not that the information that is
disclosed is not truthful, this tort is a non-starter. The tort of
misappropriation of name or likeness for commercial purposes
also has limited applicability to commerce on the Internet.144
Information gathered online is not used to sell products or to
associate the profiled subject with a particular product to use in a
testimonial manner, rather the information is used in the
decision-making process about marketing products or services
online. Such information, although "appropriated" online, is not
the appropriation that has historically been the subject of the
tort of appropriation.
Finally, it must be recognized that the Internet is a unique
public forum in which certain pieces of information may be
considered "personal" without really being "private", such as a
phone number or an e-mail address. This blurred line makes
without their consent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(c) (1977). First
Amendment concerns limit the use of this tort only to situations where the subject is not a
public figure. Id.
142 Belgum, supra note 5, at 23 (noting that certain privacy torts have "been crippled
by First Amendment precedents holding that no tort liability may attach to the press for
giving further publicity to facts obtained from public sources."). Although the torts of
intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts are unlikely to apply to the
disclosure of arguably public information such as names, addresses and phone numbers,
release of other information on a more personal nature such as transaction histories may
arguably trigger these torts.
143 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(e) (1977).
144 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 133, at 854 ("The effect of the appropriation
decisions is to recognize or create an exclusive right in the individual plaintiff to a species
of trade name, his own, and a kind of trademark in his likeness.").
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application of the privacy torts easier said than done. Whatever
common law tort remedy may theoretically be available, however,
it is widely believed that the states will not even attempt to
regulate privacy on the Internet because of the obvious
difficulties such regulation poses including regulating a medium
with no jurisdictional boundaries. 145
IV. SAFEGUARDING CITIZENS' RIGHTS WITH
COMPREHENSIVE PRIVACY LEGISLATION AND THE
CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PRIVACY COMMISSION
The failure of existing statutory and common law to provide
sufficient protections against information abuse in online
commercial transactions requires the enactment of a new federal
statute that directly addresses such concerns. 146 Crafting such a
proper privacy protection statute will be a complex endeavor.' 47
Indeed, legal scholars, practitioners and legislatures have
proposed a wide-range of solutions to the privacy issue.1 48 Such
reform requires a keen awareness of not only the technology
itself, but also potential uses of the technology. Congress can no
longer continue to avoid the issue of privacy rights by shaping
145 Cynthia C. Cannady and Katrin M. Cusack, Privacy Statements On The Internet-
A Summary OfApplicable Law And A Practical Guide, in THIRD ANNUAL INTERNET LAW
INSTITUTE, at 733, 738 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literacy Prop. Course
Handbook Series No. GO-0051, 1999) ("[I]t is safe to assume that the states will not
attempt to regulate privacy on the Internet because of the obvious difficulty of regulating
interstate, and international conduct.").
146 JAMES M. ATKINSON, RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF TELECOMMUNICATION, 2
(1990) (declaring that "detailed examination of some of the privacy invasion issues in the
rapidly changing telecommunications technology will demonstrate that the right to
privacy cannot continue to be defined by a capricious approach.").
147 The United States is not the only country struggling to develop legislation
governing commerce over the Internet. The need for global solutions have prompted
assorted international bodies such as the European Union, the Organization for
Cooperation and Development and the United Nations to examine the best methods for
the protection of privacy over the Internet. See Berman and Mulligan, supra note 42, at
556. The current European model guarantees a wide-range of rights to insure the privacy
protection of its citizens. See Reidenberg, supra note 58, at 776. The European system is
premised on the theory of "self-determination" that "imposes responsibilities on data
processors in connection with the acquisition, storage, use, and disclosure of personal
information and, at the same time, accords citizens the right to consent to the processing
of their personal information and the right to access stored personal data and have errors
corrected." Id.
148 See Topping, supra note 37, at 189 ("What is clear, however, is that legal scholars,
practitioners, and legislators wield quite a number of different-and often conflicting-
solutions to the perplexities of the Internet.").
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"the right to privacy according to the public's reactions to
changes in the society."1 49 Congress must be proactive and
promulgate legislation that will sufficiently regulate privacy in
the context of the rapidly changing technology environment. 150
The legislation must provide clear guidelines to protect those
who engage in online commercial transactions. It should
regulate the collection, use and dissemination of all personal
financial information regardless of whether the information is to
be stored or sold to a third party. Congress should pass
legislation that puts consumers back in charge of their personal
information by mandating that before a commercial web site can
collect any personally identifiable data, the consumer must
expressly agree, or "opt-in" to such data collection. Then, if the
consumer expressly agrees to allow his personal information to
be collected, the commercial web sites must notify the consumer
of exactly what information is being collected and how it will be
used. The legislation must also provide some redress for
consumers that are concerned about inaccurate information.
Additionally, unlike existing legislation, the new statute must
provide severe penalties for commercial Internet sites that
violate the statute.151
To establish a legal framework that provides predictable and
uniform rules to regulate the collection and use of personal
149 See ATKINSON, supra note 142, at 2. See generally Aristotle G. Mirzaian, Y2K
Who Cares? We Have Bigger Problems: Choice of Law in Electronic Contracts, 6 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 18, 136 (1999) (asserting that Congress can regulate electronic commerce
pursuant to its commerce clause power); Kent D. Stuckey, Market Without Bounds-So
Far: Could Old Laws put a Crimp on Cyberspace, 5 BUS. L. TODAY 52, 56 (1996)
(suggesting that developments in electronic commerce require quick changes in law).
150 See Mirzaian, supra note 145, at 136 (asserting that Congress can regulate
electronic commerce pursuant to its commerce clause power); Stuckey, supra note 145, at
56 (suggesting that developments in electronic commerce require quick changes in law);
John P. Tomaszewski, The Pandora's Box of Cyberspace: State Regulation of Digital
Signatures and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 33 GONz. L. REV. 417, 423 (1997) (stating
that electronic commerce is interstate activity that will not be regulated by burdensome
state statutes); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress authority through
Commerce Clause to regulate commerce among states and with foreign nations including
ability to resolve most every issue that would arise under the rubric of electonic
commerce).
151 Thus far, the simplest and least controversial legislative proposal for protecting
privacy in online commerce is the Online Privacy Provision contained in Title III of the
Internet Growth and Development Act of 1999, HR 1685. That proposal would require
commercial web site operators that collect personally identifiable information to post a
privacy policy and then to treat a violation of the policy as an unfair or deceptive trade
practice. Id. This would, at a minimum, provide a baseline of privacy protection.
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information, Congress must delegate some of its supervisory
authority to an entity that can more readily ensure that existing
laws and policies are continually examined and modified to adapt
to new technology. Over the last few years, much has been made
about the role of the FTC as the protector of privacy rights of
Internet users. 152 In fact, the FTC has held itself out as the de
facto privacy agency in the United States and the regulatory
agency primarily responsible for enforcing industry self-
regulatory policies. 153 But the FTC has fallen woefully short in
its mandate and has produced minimal assistance in enforcing
privacy rights for online consumers. 154 Critics contend that the
FTC has failed because it lacks the necessary expertise to
develop and implement privacy policy. 155
To effectively protect citizen privacy in electronic commerce,
Congress should create an independent privacy commission to
develop privacy legislation and lead the efforts to advance it both
in the public and private sector. 156 This independent privacy
152 See George W. Gekas and James W. Harper, Early Returns From Government
Regulation Of Electronic Commerce: What's New Is What's Old, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 769,
785 (1999) ("Since 1995, the FTC has been pushing aggressively for a role as the arbiter of
privacy issues in electronic commerce."); Scott Killingsworth, Minding Your Own
Business: Privacy Policies in Principle and in Practice, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 60 (1999)
(discussing the FTC's role in personal privacy issues on Internet); Mozelle W. Thompson,
The Challenges of Law in Cyberspace - Fostering the Growth and Safety of E-Commerce,
6 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 1, 18-19 (2000) (stating FTC's approach to privacy and data
protection).
153 See L. Richard Fischer, rivacy And Accuracy Of Personal Information, 3 N.C.
BANIUNG INST. 23 (1999) (stating that FTC has conducted several workshops focusing on
online privacy issues); Pippin, supra note 7, at 134 ("In short, the Commission [FTC]
should generally be viewed as the primary agency responsible for consumer protection on
the Internet and, specifically, for protecting Internet consumer privacy."); Melugin, supra
note 79, at A18 (stating that FTC has "expanded their grip on the Internet").
154 See Belgum, supra note 5, at 136 (criticizing limited nature of FTC's proposed
Internet-related privacy legislation); Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media,
51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 712-13 (1999) (stating that FTC's theme of electronic media self-
regulation had not protected consumer privacy); Pippin, supra note 7, at 135 ("Despite the
Commission's leadership role, its conclusions and especially its recommendations on
addressing on-line privacy concerns have met with mixed reviews and dissent from
consumer privacy organizations, Congress, and from within the Commission itself.").
155 See Reidenberg, supra note 58, at 791 (stating that existing governmental
agencies are sectoral and lack expertise in cross-sectoral issues); see also Budnitz, supra
note 54, at 867 (discussing consumer and privacy groups' criticisms of FTC); Pippin, supra
note 7, at 134 (suggesting that FTC lacks authority to require businesses to adopt
information practice policies); Saier, supra note 9, at 88 (stating that current and
proposed federal protections of informational privacy are unsatisfactory).
156 See David Banisar, Roadblocks On The Information Superhighway, 41 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 495, 495 (Aug. 1994) ("The United States is one of a few democracies without
an independent, autonomous commission to examine the privacy implications of
government actions."); Reidenberg, supra note 58, at 790 ("While counterintuitive for
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commission would offer numerous benefits for both citizens and
the online commerce industry. 157 The commission would serve as
a forum for collaboration with privacy experts, the public interest
community, the government and the business community.
Additionally, the commission would monitor developments in
information technology and document their impact on personal
privacy; develop public privacy initiatives; advise Congress about
protecting the privacy of online consumers in the face of evolving
technology and provide an objective voice to ensure that a careful
balance between the interests of the online commerce industry to
collect and disseminate information and the public's right to
privacy are achieved.158
Another benefit that an independent privacy commission can
provide is prospective guidance to both the consumer and the
Internet retailer. The commission would be empowered with the
authority to grant safe harbor protections for company practices.
Similar to the no-action letters issued from the Securities and
Exchange Commission, a company seeking approval of certain
policies could seek a request for approval from the commission. 159
many in the United States, a U.S. Information Privacy Commission is urgently needed.");
Simitis, supra note 67, at 742-43 (recommending establishment of an independent control
authority). But see Gekas, supra note 148, at 785 ("Since 1995, the FTC has been pushing
aggressively for a role as the arbiter of privacy issues in electronic commerce."); Pippin,
supra note 7, at 134 ("In short, the Commission [FTC] should generally be viewed as the
primary agency responsible for consumer protection on the Internet and, specifically, for
protecting Internet consumer privacy.").
157 See Banisar, supra note 156, at 495 ("Such an agency provides an objective voice
within the government to ensure that civil liberties are upheld when proposals are
designed.") (endnote omitted); Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise Garnet-Pol, The
Fundamental Role Of Privacy And Confidence In The Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
105, 124 (1995) ('A [Privacy Protection] Commission would be instrumental in achieving
public awareness of information practices and in securing greater citizen participation in
the circulation of personal information."); see also Reidenberg, supra note 58, at 790
("While counterintuitive for many in the United States, a U.S. Information Privacy
Commission is urgently needed."); Simitis, supra note 67, at 742-43 (recommending
establishment of an independent control authority).
158 See Fulton, supra note 54, at 70 ("Until the legislature truly understands the
complex highway of computer technology, the current laws will remain inadequate."); see
also Trubow, supra note 9, at 835 (noting that fair balancing has yet to be achieved by
current regulations). See generally Berman, supra note 42, at 555 (stating that current
national laws may be insufficient to protect Internet privacy).
159 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in an Information Economy: A Fortress or
Frontier for Individual Rights 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 242 (1992) (proposing safe
harbor mechanism for online industry). See generally Julia Gladstone, The US. Privacy
Balance and the European Privacy Directive: Reflextions on the United States Privacy
Policy, 7 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RES. 10, 24 (2000) (discussing current U.S.
regulations and safe harbor provisions concerning privacy and Internet use with
European Union); Suzanne M. Thompson, The Digital Explosion Comes with a Cost: The
2002]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
Such an approval from the commission would mean that the
company's practices satisfy the legal standards for protecting
personal privacy. Over time, those safe harbor decisions would
provide a coherent body of public guidance and would increase
the public's awareness of information collection practices. This
would, in turn, foster greater public participation in the privacy
debate and hopefully lead to the public's acceptance of online
commerce.
V. CONCLUSION
The emergence of electronic commerce in today's society has
had a dramatic effect on the methods in which information is
gathered, used and perceived. Information is no longer a means
to an end, it serves as an end in itself.160 But while technological
innovations allowing for commerce on the Internet have greatly
improved our lives, they have come at a great price-the loss of
personal privacy.'61 Although the law provides limited privacy
rights in certain narrow contexts and with respect to limited
types of information, there is universal recognition of the need to
ensure that proper measures are implemented to guard against
informational abuses in online commercial transactions. 162
Privacy rights, of course, are not absolute and must be
balanced with other competing interests such as the interests of
commercial web operators in obtaining information to better
serve the consumer.1 63 To date, however, the balance has tipped
decidedly in favor of the web operators since it is the web
Loss of Privacy, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 3, 80 (1999) (discussing possible approaches to
resolving privacy problems on Internet).
160 See Reilly, supra note 20, at 4 ("Privacy has evolved from a small single-function
business into a complex conglomerate.")..
161 See Fulton, supra note 54, at 69 ("[Wlith the ease and convenience of new
technology comes new avenues for user exposure to personal, political and business
sabotage, and economic loss.").
162 See Trubow, supra note 9, at 832 ("It is certainly this writer's opinion that a
regulatory framework for the Internet is necessary if it is to become a truly useful and
reliable communications channel for business, government and society. The current state
of anarchy on the Internet renders the system inadequate for widespread, serious use.").
163 There are several reasons why privacy interests on the Internet must not be
absolute, such as the need to investigate and prevent hackers; to prevent and investigate
the use of the Internet to coordinate or plan crime; to verify the accuracy of time billed to
customers; and to allow employers to prevent the dissemination of trade secrets.See
Wigod, supra note 33, at 95.
[Vol. 16:393
PRIVA CY IN INTERNET COMMERCE
operators themselves that are making the rules. Because the
regulation of data collection is vital to society's acceptance of the
Internet as a commercial medium, formulation and
implementation of comprehensive privacy legislation must be
made a congressional priority.
The legislation should empower consumers through consent
provisions and foster accountability through severe penalties for
its violation. To spearhead those efforts, Congress should
establish an independent privacy agency with the necessary
expertise and resources to achieve a mutually beneficial
equilibrium of legislative policy that regulates only as far as
necessary to restrict abuses of privacy while contemporaneously
enabling technological progress. But whatever model of
information privacy protection is adopted, it must be dynamic
and subject to continual review so that it may be adapted to
advances in technology. 164
Consumer privacy protection on the Internet is a problem that
will not be easily solved. We are now at the beginning of a long
and complex process. We will constantly have to make decisions
about how important we believe our right to privacy to be and
exactly what measures we are willing to take to protect that
precious right. But we must embrace the empowerment provided
by ever-advancing technology instead of fearing its impacts.
Online commerce promises enormous rewards for both
consumers and merchants if the obstacles to privacy protection
can be conquered.165
164 See LAURENCE TRIBE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CYBERSPACE: LAW AND LIBERTY
BEYOND THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER, KEYNOTE ADDRESS AT THE FIRST CONFERENCE ON
COMPUTERS, FREEDOM AND PRIVACY (PAGE) (1991) (stating that core constitutional
principles, such as privacy, must be "invariab(le] ... despite accidents of technology.").
165 See Reilly, supra note 20, at 4 ("(P)rivacy should be viewed as a foundational
concept in the same manner that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are
foundational concepts in our society.").
2002]

